Cost-benefit analysis: the first real rule of fight club? by Kristin L. Hillman
REVIEW ARTICLE
published: 19 December 2013
doi: 10.3389/fnins.2013.00248
Cost-benefit analysis: the first real rule of fight club?
Kristin L. Hillman*
Department of Psychology, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand
Edited by:
Steve W. C. Chang, Duke University,
USA
Masaki Isoda, Kansai Medical
University, Japan
Reviewed by:
Naotaka Fujii, RIKEN Brain Science
Institute, Japan
Jérôme Sallet, University of Oxford,
UK
*Correspondence:
Kristin L. Hillman, Department of
Psychology, University of Otago,
William James Building, 275 Leith
Walk, Dunedin 9016, New Zealand
e-mail: khillman@psy.otago.ac.nz
Competition is ubiquitous among social animals. Vying against a conspecific to achieve
a particular outcome often requires one to act aggressively, but this is a costly and
inherently risky behavior. So why do we aggressively compete, or at the extreme, fight
against others? Early work suggested that competitive aggression might stem from an
innate aggressive tendency, emanating from subcortical structures. Later work highlighted
key cortical regions that contribute toward an instrumental aggression network, one that
is recruited or suppressed as needed to achieve a goal. Recent neuroimaging work
hints that competitive aggression is upmost a cost-benefit decision, in that it appears
to recruit many components of traditional, non-social decision-making networks. This
review provides a historical glimpse into the neuroscience of competitive aggression, and
proposes a conceptual advancement for studying competitive behavior by outlining how
utility calculations of contested-for resources are skewed, pre- and post-competition. A
basic multi-factorial model of utility assessment is proposed to account for competitive
endowment effects that stem from the presence of peers, peer salience and disposition,
and the tactical effort required for victory. In part, competitive aggression is a learned
behavior that should only be repeated if positive outcomes are achieved. However, due to
skewed utility assessments, deviations of associative learning occur. Hence truly careful
cost-benefit analysis is warranted before choosing to vie against another.
Keywords: competitive behavior, decision making, aggression, cost-benefit, utility, competition
A critical consideration in social decision-making is whether
or not to compete against a conspecific. Competitive action
can take many forms, for example it could involve a quick,
direct, physical fight between two individuals, or long, covert,
strategic manoeuvres between groups. In all of its forms, com-
petitive engagement carries the implicit goal of outperforming
conspecifics in order to achieve resources or other outcomes
that facilitate self-preservation. Direct competitive aggression is
one of the most observable forms of competitive engagement
amongst social animals. This specific form of competitive action
is frequently required to obtain or protect a resource, but it is
energetically costly and inherently risky. So how do we know
when (or when not) to put up a fight?
Early investigations in psychoanalysis, ethology and neuro-
science suggested that animals have an innate aggressive drive,
stemming from basally active subcortical networks. While this
idea might explain the behavior of certain characters from
the 1990’s media phenomenon Fight Club, it does not fit well
with common patterns of animal behavior. Socially, constant
aggressive tendencies would create a tense and nihilistic world.
Physiologically, subcortical circuits that were basally active would
require an inordinate amount of cortical energy to suppress.
It would be more evolutionarily advantageous for animals to
have an instrumental aggression network (IAN), one that can
be recruited for competitive action only when it’s worthwhile to
compete.
Determining whether competitive aggression is worthwhile
represents a cost-benefit decision, largely reliant on the same neu-
ral networks that process non-social decision variables. There
is an outcome at stake that you want. How much do you want it
and what costs will be incurred in obtainment? Reward valuation
and cost assessment are paramount. The presence of others who
also want that same outcome simply makes for multi-factorial
cost-benefit analysis. Peer interest should enhance the utility of
the outcome, providing an endowment effect that can be mod-
ulated by the composition of the peer group, and the expected
ferocity of their competitive tactics. Expended competitive effort
can discount the utility of the outcome, but can also provide
an immediate endowment effect of deservingness for the victor.
Multi-factorial cost-benefit analysis thus structures competitive
aggression, informing us when and when not to put up a fight.
AN INNATE DRIVE TO FIGHT?
In the 21st century it’s easy to ascribe competition to supply-
and-demand; in increasingly crowded environments, resource
competition is mathematically inevitable. But perhaps there is
something more basic, more primal occurring. Perhaps there is
an innate need to, at times, be agonistic and aggressive toward
others? Lorenz termed this the fighting instinct (Lorenz, 1966),
Freud summed it up as the outward expression of the internal
death drive: thanatos (Freud, 1922).
Goltz (1892) and others in the late 19th and early 20th cen-
turies started to give neural credence to this idea of an innate
aggressive drive. Decerebrate dogs and cats exhibited abnor-
mally aggressive behavior, spontaneously and in response to
non-noxious stimuli such as routine handling (Goltz, 1892;
Bard, 1928, 1934). The emergent idea that aggression stemmed
from subcortical structures was strengthened by early stimulation
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studies. Subcortical stimulation, specifically in the posterior
hypothalamus, produced agonistic behavior in birds and cats
(Woodworth and Sherrington, 1904; Ingram et al., 1932; Bard,
1934; Hess and Brugger, 1943; Hess, 1954; Holst and St. Paul,
1960; Phillips and Youngren, 1973). This “sham rage” incorpo-
rated a range of phenotypic combative behaviors (Cannon and
Britton, 1925; Bard, 1934). Sano et al. (1970) were the first to use
electrocauterization of the posterior hypothalamus in humans to
successfully reduce pathological aggression.
In addition to the posterior hypothalamus, regions of the brain
stem and thalamus have been found to contribute toward sham
rage responses. For example, stimulation of the periaqueductal
gray (PAG) can elicit aggressive behaviors, vocalizations and low-
ered fear responses in a variety of species (Magoun et al., 1937;
Kelly et al., 1946; Delgado, 1963; Phillips and Youngren, 1973).
Lesioning of the PAG prevents hypothalamus-stimulated sham
rage from occurring, indicating a functional coupling between
these regions in aggressive behavior (Fernandez De Molina and
Hunsperger, 1962). Lesions to the locus coeruleus also result in
submissive behaviors in rats when competing for water (Plewako
and Kostowski, 1984). Manipulations to the ventral thalamus, the
diencephalic extension of reticular activating system, mimic brain
stem manipulations. Stimulation of ventral thalamus in monkeys
results in antisocial, fighting behavior (Delgado, 1963), whereas
lesioning results in behavioral inhibition in rats (Turner, 1970),
cats (Adey et al., 1962), and humans (Andy et al., 1963).
Thus areas of the posterior hypothalamus, midbrain and ven-
tral thalamus contribute toward an aggression network, with elec-
trical stimulation of any node of the network resulting in sham
rage. Baseline activity within the network—usually suppressed
by higher level cortical mechanisms—could represent a primal,
thanatos-like drive to dominate conspecifics. In decorticate ani-
mals sham rage was sometimes reported to occur spontaneously,
indicative of basal subcortical activity (Goltz, 1892; Bard, 1928,
1934). However, such spontaneous rage was often directed toward
non-specific objects and sometimes even self-directed. Hence
basal activity in this subcortical aggression network is unlikely to
drive strategic competitive aggression; the resultant actions do not
enhance, and could actually hurt self-preservation, the ultimate
evolutionary goal of competitive action.
INSTRUMENTAL AGGRESSION NETWORK
In decorticate animals sham rage was more often reported in
response to stimuli, both noxious and non-noxious stimuli. This
suggests that cortical mechanisms, instead of constantly sup-
pressing a basally active subcortical network, serve to activate
an aggression network in response to incoming stimuli. Regions
in the hypothalamus, brain stem, and ventral thalamus could
therefore be said to contribute toward an IAN. In corticate ani-
mals, the IAN is recruited when sensory stimuli indicate that
aggressive action is instrumental toward self-preservation. In
decorticate animals, appropriate assessment of what constitutes
aggression-inducing sensory stimuli is lacking, and sham rage can
result.
Assessment and valencing of sensory stimuli as aggressive-
inducing or otherwise implies a role for the amygdala, and
indeed stimulation of the amygdala produces defensive reactions
that have been interpreted as sham rage (Clemente and Chase,
1973). However such behavior is ameliorated by hypothala-
mic or midbrain lesion (Fernandez De Molina and Hunsperger,
1962), suggesting that “amygdaloid rage” is dependent on down-
stream activation of hypothalamic or midbrain nodes of the IAN.
Amygdaloid lesions result in loss of competitive behaviors in dogs,
cats and rodents when competing against conspecifics for food
(Fuller et al., 1957; Bunnell et al., 1966; Zagrodzka et al., 1983;
Lukaszewska et al., 1984). Lesions of the amygdala in monkey
can result in a loss of social dominance (Rosvold et al., 1954)
or generalized placidity (Kluver and Bucy, 1939). Stereotactic
amygdalotomy has been used successfully in humans to treat
intractable aggression (Mpakopoulou et al., 2008).
In some studies, however, amygdaloid lesions have produced
the opposite effect on aggression. Bard and Mountcastle (1948)
and Wood (1958) reported that ablation of the amygdala in
cat produced an increase in aggression. Elements of the Kluver
and Bucy (1939) also hint at contradictory patterns of behav-
ior: amygdalotomy in monkeys produces general placidity, yet
hyperactivity, hypersexualty, and hyperreactivity to environmen-
tal stimuli. Behavioral differences in amygdaloid lesion studies are
likely attributable to spatially distinct functional regions within
the structure.
With regard to the IAN, stimulation of the basolateral amyg-
dala (BLA) increases hypothalamic excitability while stimulation
of the corticomedial amygdala (CMA) suppresses hypothalamic
discharge (Dreifuss et al., 1968). Further studies that specifically
targeted the stria terminalis, the major septal pathway linking
the CMA to the hypothalamus, showed that electrical stimulation
of this pathway inhibits aggression in monkeys (Delgado, 1963),
while destruction of this pathway increases aggression and dom-
inance in rodents and cats (Brady and Nauta, 1953; Fernandez
De Molina and Hunsperger, 1959; Turner, 1970). The central
nucleus of the amygdala projects inhibitory afferents to nodes
of the IAN, including the hypothalamus and brainstem (Jongen-
Relo and Amaral, 1998; Saha et al., 2000; Ghashghaei and Barbas,
2002).
Findings such as these suggest the CMA and its major subcorti-
cal afferent pathway play an important role in braking immediate
IAN activation upon sensory input. This initial braking mecha-
nism may be overruled by dangerous stimuli (e.g., pain), which
near-reflexively activate the sympathetic nervous system and the
thalamo-amygdala pathway. This can prompt IAN activation and
subsequent aggression. Indeed aggression is frequently observed
in response to painful stimuli, providing a feedforward mecha-
nism for escalation of aggression in combative fights.
Alternatively, this CMA braking mechanism on the IAN may
be potentiated by fear- or caution-inducing stimuli (e.g., vocal-
izations from dominant conspecifics), which would contribute
toward the efficacy of threat cues in preventing competitive
fights. In rats, CMA lesion results in failure to avoid domi-
nant conspecifics (Luiten et al., 1985). In humans, increased
amygdalar activity is observed in response to fearful facial expres-
sions (Asghar et al., 2008; Gamer and Buchel, 2009), however,
reduced amygdalar activation is seen in the same task in children
with disruptive behavioral disorders (Marsh et al., 2008; Jones
et al., 2009). This contrasts with reports of increased amygdalar
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activation in response to social threat cues in individuals with
impulsive aggression (Coccaro et al., 2007). These contradictions
may speak to a functional separation between the CMA and the
BLA that, in the past, has been difficult to resolve with neu-
roimaging. Newer approaches though, for example the functional
connectivity MRI seed analysis used by Bickart et al. (2012), are
starting to delineate regional differences within the amygdala in
regard to social behavior.
In opposition to the IAN braking mechanism exerted by the
CMA, activity in the BLA can enhance activity in subcortical
IAN nodes (Dreifuss et al., 1968). Given the BLA encodes incen-
tive value of stimuli across time (Pickens et al., 2003; Holland
and Gallagher, 2004; Winstanley et al., 2004), highly salient sen-
sory stimuli—positively or negatively valenced—may drive IAN
activation, spurring aggressive behavior. This could account for
the emergence of competitive aggression to obtain highly appet-
itive resources, or frustration aggression after a salient, nega-
tively valenced event such as the absence of an expected reward.
Amygdalar hyperactivity is reported in instances of reactive “hot”
aggression and other forms of impulsive behavior (Coccaro et al.,
2007; Sterzer and Stadler, 2009). It is possible that BLA activity
accounts for the majority of this amygdalar hyperactivity seen in
reactive “hot” aggression studies, with BLA activity driving IAN
activity, resulting in combative behavior. Again approaches such
as functional connectivity MRI seed analysis (Bickart et al., 2012)
could be used to test interactions between the BLA and the IAN,
and the CMA and the IAN, in relation to aggressive behavior.
In the search for the common denominator of amyg-
dala function—e.g., valence, arousal, or relevance—competitive
activation may be worth considering. Amygdalar assessment of
sensory stimuli could inform an organism to “act now, act com-
petitively” or to “not act competitively in this situation,” keeping
in mind that acting competitively encompasses a range of tac-
tics. For example, one may need to act quickly (scramble com-
petition), aggressively (contest competition) or slyly (strategic
competition). In line with this idea, abnormalities in amygadalar
activity would manifest as impaired competitive effort allocation,
generating a spectrum of behaviors ranging from hyperaggres-
sion on one end, to avolition and social withdrawal on the other.
A similar spectrum is seen following damage to regions of the
prefrontal cortex (PFC). Blumer and Benson’s characterization
(1975) of pseudopsychopathy and pseudodepression, correlated
to damage in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and dorsolateral PFC
(dlPFC), respectively, could also be framed as deficits in com-
petitive effort allocation, and suggest that the PFC also plays an
important role in modulating competitive action.
PREFRONTAL MODULATION OF AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIORS
Advanced oversight of competitive aggression, particularly in
terms of preventing actions that could prove costly, is usually
attributed to the PFC. The ventromedial PFC (vmPFC), OFC,
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and dlPFC have been implicated
in controlling aggressive behaviors. Prefrontal regulatory control
over the IAN can occur via direct pathways to the subcortical
nuclei or via indirect pathways utilizing the amygdala (Ongur
et al., 1998; McDonald et al., 1999; Delville et al., 2000; Etkin
et al., 2006; Toth et al., 2010). In humans, activity in the vmPFC
decreases when subjects imagine aggressive actions (Pietrini et al.,
2000), and hypoactivity in the OFC and ACC is reported in
aggressive cohorts (Davidson et al., 2000). OFC hypoactivity
is seen in manic phases of bipolar disorder (Blumberg et al.,
1999), and in borderline personality disorder (Soloff et al., 2003).
Damage to the OFC produces a well-established dysregulation
of behavior which can include aggressive outbursts and impul-
siveness (Anderson et al., 1999). PFC hypoactivity, coincident
with hyperactivity in the amygdala, midbrain and thalamus, was
reported in a PET study of criminals who committed impul-
sive/affective murders (Raine et al., 1997).
In laboratory animals, OFC lesions variably affect aggression
(Giancola, 1995), in part due to complicated bidirectional con-
nectivity with the amygdala. Caudal OFC sends a direct projec-
tion to the central nucleus of the amygdala, activation of the latter
serving to inhibit hypothalamic and brainstem regions of the
IAN (Ghashghaei and Barbas, 2002). However, OFC also sends
projections to the intercalated masses of the amygdala, where
excitation of local GABAergic cells inhibit central nucleus output
(Ghashghaei and Barbas, 2002), which would disinhibit the IAN.
Hence OFC is poised to both recruit and suppress competitive
aggression.
The ACC, dlPFC, and vmPFC are more implicated in sup-
pressing aggressive behaviors. In cats, bilateral lesion of the ACC
gyrus generates a hyperaggressive phenotype, inclusive of sham
rage in response to handling and directed rage toward con-
specifics (Kennard, 1955). Stimulation of the ACC gyrus or dlPFC
increases the latency and reduces the severity of hypothalamic-
induced feline sham rage (Siegel and Chabora, 1971). Inmonkeys,
bilateral ablation of the dlPFC increases aggression (Kamback and
Rogal, 1973; Mass and Kling, 1975).
In humans, dlPFC activation is seen in many instances of
emotional regulation, some instances perhaps necessitating sup-
pression of a desire to act combatively toward a conspecific, e.g.
accepting unfair offers in the Ultimatum game (Sanfey et al.,
2003). The dlPFC, OFC, and ACC are also activated when people
are intentionally angered (Dougherty et al., 1999; Kimbrell et al.,
1999) or shown angry facial expressions (Blair et al., 1999), but
withhold reactive behaviors. This emotional regulation may be
analogous to reversal learning, whereby one is suppressing aggres-
sive output in response to stimuli which may have previously
aroused negative affect (Davidson et al., 2000).
This type of emotional regulation, whereby aggressive reac-
tions are suppressed, has implications for social hierarchy main-
tenance, which in turn influences competitive behavior. While
direct competitive aggression is needed to initially establish a
hierarchy, dominance hierarchies ultimately serve to reduce fight-
ing amongst social animals. Growing evidence suggests that the
dlPFC and ACC register elements of social state that may then
modulate downstream activation of the IAN. For example, Fujii
et al. (2009) reported that neurons in monkey dlPFC register
social state during a competitive food-grabbing task, with neu-
rons of dominant monkeys in an “up state” and neurons of sub-
missive monkeys in a “down state.” Wang et al. (2011) reported
that neurons in the ACC and prelimbic cortex of dominant mice
exhibit heightened AMPA-mediated synaptic efficacy as com-
pared to subordinate mice. Moreover molecular manipulations
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that increased or decreased medial prefrontal synaptic efficacy
in these mice resulted in respective upward or downward move-
ments in social rank (Wang et al., 2011).
One interpretation of these studies is that heightened tonic
prefrontal activity in dominant animals may indicate that the
network is “primed” for action, and aggressive tactics—via down-
stream activation of the IAN—can be deployed quickly if needed.
Quick aggressive responses would increase the chances of suc-
cess in a competitive encounter and thereby maintain social
rank. In this way tonic prefrontal activity may be more indica-
tive of behavioral planning, as compared to the phasic prefrontal
activity patterns that are linked to acute inhibition of aggres-
sive behavior and cognitive control of emotion (Miller and
Cohen, 2001). Indeed the vmPFC, OFC, ACC, and dlPFC are
poised to drive aggressive tactics if instrumental in achieving a
desired outcome. Reward encoding is well-established in the OFC
(Schoenbaum et al., 2000; Wallis and Miller, 2003; Walton et al.,
2007), social reward encoding in the ACC gyrus (Rudebeck et al.,
2006; Chang et al., 2013), effort-outcome encoding in the ACC
(Walton et al., 2007; Hillman and Bilkey, 2010, 2012), and sub-
jective value is represented in the vmPFC (Kable and Glimcher,
2007). Thus, depending on which literature is followed, these pre-
frontal regions comprise an emotional regulation network or a
reward-based decision-making network.
Parsimony can emerge between the two when competitive
aggression is viewed in terms of cost-benefit analysis: Is an aggres-
sive action/emotional reaction worthwhile? Prefrontal activity can
suppress combative behaviors if they are likely to be costly to the
individual, or drive competitive tactics if beneficial. Indeed justi-
fied aggressiveness (e.g., attacking an attacker) is associated with
PFC activation in humans and rats (Halasz et al., 2006; King et al.,
2006). In humans, simply viewing a superior ranked competitor
elicits activity in the PFC, amygdala and thalamus (Zink et al.,
2008)—perhaps readying, and/or steadying, IAN activation.
DECIDING TO COMPETE
If the IAN is not basally active, and in fact oftentimes purposely
suppressed when angered, then what drives recruitment? Other
than in pathological conditions of non-instrumental aggression,
we compete with each other only when it’s worthwhile, i.e., the
outcome of pending competitive aggression is deemed valuable.
Tangible resources that aid self-preservation could be in question,
or self-preservation itself might be the goal in situations of self-
defence. Cost-benefit-based outcome valuation thus becomes the
lynchpin of competitive action: if there is not something worth
fighting for, then you won’t fight.
It is well-established that in non-social choice behavior, out-
come valuation is learned via trial-and-error and is dependent
on midbrain-striatal-frontal circuitry. Phasic activation of mid-
brain dopaminergic cells correlates to reward prediction errors
(Schultz, 1998). Downstream activity in ventral striatum occurs
in both appetitive and aversive learning paradigms, with dorsal
striatum implicated in response-reward contingencies (Schultz
et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2004; Cohen, 2008). Primary and
secondary reward preferences, reward anticipation and reward
receipt have been correlated to single-unit and fMRI activity in
the OFC (Critchley and Rolls, 1996; Watanabe, 1996; Gottfried
et al., 2003; Small et al., 2003; Kennerley and Wallis, 2009).
When incurred costs need to be integrated with reward value,
various prefrontal subregions are recruited (Walton et al., 2007;
Hillman and Bilkey, 2010). Negative outcomes elicit consistent
activity in the anterior insula (AI) proportional to subjective aver-
sion (Mojzisch and Schulz-Hardt, 2007; Seymour et al., 2007).
The intensity of an outcome, irrespective of positive or negative
valence, has been linked to activity in the amygdala (Holland and
Gallagher, 2004). Together these regions provide an assessment of
outcome, pre- and post-action, that help to optimize non-social
choice behavior over time.
It is plausible that these same regions provide an assessment
of outcome, pre- and post-competitive aggression, that help to
optimize competitive behavior over time. Social actions, com-
petitive or otherwise, have positive or negative outcomes for the
self, which may be better or worse than expected. Social actions
that enhance the evolutionary fitness of an individual should
be represented as “rewarding,” e.g., positive prediction errors in
midbrain-striatal regions would be expected, as well as increased
activity in OFC for preference formation. Social actions that ham-
per an individual’s fitness should be represented as “aversive,” e.g.,
activity in AI would be expected proportional to negative affect,
as well as increased activity in ACC for unrequited effort and
conflict. In line with Thorndike’s Law of Effect (1911) and rein-
forcement learning theory (Sutton and Barto, 1998), any social
course of action that results in a self-referenced positive outcome
should be increasingly repeated.
Winning a direct competitive encounter does reinforce com-
petitive behavior across a variety of species. For example, victori-
ous fruit flies are more likely to instigate subsequent competitive
bouts, with markedly higher odds of victory in that bout (Chen
et al., 2002; Yurkovic et al., 2006). In humans, winning a compet-
itive encounter elicits activity in the ventral striatum and OFC,
even if winning is passively achieved (Katsyri et al., 2013; van
den Bos et al., 2013; though see Delgado et al., 2008). Winning
against a superior-ranked player additionally elicits activity in the
dorsal striatum, mPFC and nodes of the IAN, suggesting estab-
lishment of a profitable, aggression-dependent action-outcome
contingency (Zink et al., 2008).
In humans, winning also activates the temporoparietal junc-
tion (TPJ). Win-related TPJ activation is greater when a larger
reward is at stake (Halko et al., 2009), and also greater in subjects
who attribute higher utility to winning in self-report measures
(van den Bos et al., 2013). Functional connectivity between the
TPJ-ventral striatum/-vmPFC is predictive of overbidding behav-
ior in a competitive auction task (van den Bos et al., 2013),
perhaps indicative of salience reinforcement. TPJ is implicated
in theory-of-mind and mentalizing networks (Assaf et al., 2009),
and also in directional attention (Corbetta et al., 2008; Mitchell,
2008). Given modern society’s emphasis on the importance of
winning, it is possible that winning—no matter how menial or
inconsequential the competitive testing task—drives directional
attention which accounts for this TPJ activation. This would
account for modulation of TPJ activity in relation to reward
size (Halko et al., 2009) and personal attribution (van den Bos
et al., 2013). Parcellation of TPJ subregions, as has been recently
shown byMars et al. (2012), represents an important step forward
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in delineating the variable functions of the TPJ in social and
non-social settings.
While winning reinforces competitive behavior, losing results
in progressive extinction of competitive behavior across a vari-
ety of species. For example, defeated rodents exhibit defeatist
behavior in subsequent competitive encounters, and show rapid
extinction in race running (Kahn, 1951; Kanak and Davenport,
1967). Defeated fruit flies develop a “loser’s mentality” (Yurkovic
et al., 2006). Human data is varied; while psychosocial research
provides evidence of defeatist patterns of behavior (e.g., related
to oppression), laboratory studies of competition often indi-
cate behavioral activation following a defeat. For example, losing
in a starting round of an iterative competitive auction reliably
prompts overbidding in subsequent initial rounds (van den Bos
et al., 2013). One important distinction between datasets is that
repeated encounters/sessions are required for behavioral extinc-
tion, not just repeated trials within a single encounter/session.
Neuroimaging studies examining repetitive sessions between the
same opponents would be of interest.
Neurally, losing a competitive round prompts activation of
the ventral striatum, AI, dorsal ACC, and nodes of the IAN in
humans (Delgado et al., 2008; Zink et al., 2008; van den Bos et al.,
2013). Negative prediction errors in the ventral striatum occur
alongside subjective aversion signals in AI and signals of con-
flict, unrequited effort or perhaps even social pain (Eisenberger
et al., 2003) in dorsal ACC. Activation of the IAN should drive
a subject to perform more aggressively in a subsequent round in
an attempt to win. AI activity increases when losing to inferior-
ranked players (Zink et al., 2008) and in subjects who attribute
greater aversion to loss in self-report measures (van den Bos et al.,
2013). Functional connectivity between the AI-ventral striatum/-
vmPFC predicts trial-by-trial overbidding in auction tasks (van
den Bos et al., 2013). Functional connectivity between the AI
and the OFC predicts defection by a player following a non-
reciprocated exchange in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (Rilling
et al., 2008). After a subjective loss, signals from the AI appear
to be important in updating striatal and prefrontal utility esti-
mates, helping to drive subsequent vigor in some instances, or
withdrawal in others.
A MULTI-FACTORIAL CALCULATION OF UTILITY
Competitive behaviors seem to be driven by more than sheer
resource value, given that we pursue resources differently depend-
ing on if we’re alone, if we’re amidst friends, or if we’re
amidst enemies. This suggests that utility estimates of desired
resources/outcomes are different in social settings. To build a
simple model of this altered utility estimate, assume that in a non-
competitive scenario, a desirable resource holds a utility (U) of x;
x being a value greater than zero, representative of a cost-benefit
valuation that has been previously established via trial-and-error
and/or observational learning. Chang et al. (2013) have recently
shown that, in social settings, prefrontal subregions differentially
encode resource valuations (x) based on frame of reference. Self-
referenced valuations predominate in the OFC and ACC sulcus,
with the former sensitive to self-experienced rewards and the
latter to self-experienced foregone rewards. Other-referenced val-
uations predominate in the ACC gyrus (Chang et al., 2013), a
region previously shown to be important in conspecific-based
learning (Behrens et al., 2008).
In a competitive social scenario, the resource still holds a value
of x, however, now others also want this resource. This produces a
pre-obtainment endowment effect: the resource’s value increases,
U = x+ (x ∗ a1), where a1 represents peer interest endowment
and ranges from 0 to 1. No peer interest in the resource (a1 =
0), up to high peer interest in the resource (a1 = 1) modulates
the perceived utility of the resource which can prompt action.
Alternatively, if peer disgust is exhibited for the resource, −1 <
a1 < 0, decreasing utility and dissuading action.
Behaviorally, the mere presence of others does prompt
resource scavenging, as is seen in social facilitation of feeding.
Satiated animals will start eating again when new animals arrive
and start eating (Bayer, 1929; Harlow, 1932). Rats trained to press
levers at 10 s intervals for food will become impulsive in the
presence of other rats, pressing the lever before the 10 s interval
(Wheeler and Davis, 1967). Both scenarios could be interpreted
as scramble competition; the resource has enhanced value in the
presence of others, which spurs action. Neurally, the presence of
others alters reward-related activity in the ventral striatum and
OFC during resource-based tasks. For example, when humans
decide to donate money to charity or keep it for themselves, the
mere presence of an observer increases activity in the ventral
striatum during the decision phase (Izuma et al., 2010), perhaps
reflective of a peer interest endowment (a1) of the monetary value
(x). Likewise, Azzi et al. (2012) have recently shown that when
fluid-deprivedmonkeys complete a task to receive amedium sized
drop of water (U = x), the mere presence of a conspecific effec-
tively doubles single-unit encoding of reward value in the OFC,
perhaps reflective of U = x+ (x ∗ a1).
Peer interest endowment (a1) is further modified by the com-
position of the peer group (g, where 1 < g < 2) and their
anticipated aggressiveness (y, where y = 1 or −1), such that U =
x+ (x ∗ (a1 ∗ (g ∗ y))). A congenial group of competitors who
also want the resource (g = 1) would exert no further change in
utility beyond the initial peer endowment effect (a1). A group
of established adversaries who also want the resource (g = 2)
would effectively double the peer endowment effect, trebling util-
ity from the initial intrinsic value x. However, even if a resource
has become highly valuable due to an adversary’s interest in the
resource, impulsive action would be unwise without weighing in
potential losses that might soon occur, in terms of lost effort, lost
status or even loss of life. If anticipated competition is expected
to be fair, with acceptable, proportional costs, y = 1. However,
if anticipated competition is expected to be highly aggressive
and contentious, for example against an established dominant
conspecific, y = −1. Hence utility assessments would be highest
for a fair fight against adversaries, and lowest for an anticipated
unfair/hostile fight against adversaries.
When considering situations where animals don’t compete
for a resource—they submit—the largest determinant appears
to be hierarchy. In a series of experiments in the 1960s, work
by Delgado (1966, 1967) showed that sham rage in monkeys—
elicited by stimulation of the ventral thalamus or PAG—was
modulated by previously established social hierarchy. Sham rage
inductions in high-ranking males did not prompt the males to
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attack their companion females, however, the males showed tar-
geted aggression toward monkeys with whom a past conflict
had occurred. Sham rage inductions in low-ranking males, when
in isolation, produced the usual repertoire of aggressive behav-
iors; however, subcortical stimulation carried out in the presence
of a conspecific would produce fleeing behavior in these mon-
keys. These studies provided an initial indication that even when
the IAN is exogenously activated, learned higher-level g and y
components can influence competitive engagement.
Recent work in monkey by Santos et al. (2012) has highlighted
a subpopulation of neurons in caudate nucleus that may con-
tribute toward the g and y components termed herein. These
social state S neurons appear to encode social state dynamics
during competitive food-grabbing tasks. S neurons have highest
activity when reward grabbing is uncontested, and lower activity
when monkeys act submissively due to a competitor’s behavior
(Santos et al., 2012). When combined with reward-related out-
come information that is encoded in the caudate by a separate
subpopulation of reward R neurons, the resultant signal should
help adjust competitive behaviors in dynamic social contexts
(Santos et al., 2012). In human imaging studies, caudate activ-
ity has been shown to increase when subjects cooperate with each
other (Rilling et al., 2002), perhaps indicative of a g = 1/y = 1 sit-
uation where the objective is uncontested, and S neuron activity
should be high.
The ACC, vmPFC, and OFC also likely contribute toward
peer-related valuations (g, y) prior to competitive encounters,
as these regions are sensitive to conspecific assessment in non-
competitive tasks. For example, in a human imaging study by
Behrens et al. (2008), participants in a choice task were chal-
lenged to integrate self-learned reward information with social
advice from a confederate partner. Separable learning rates were
observed for reward and social information, correlating to activ-
ity in the ACC sulcus and ACC gyrus, respectively. Integration of
reward-based and social information during the decision phase
was correlated to activity in the vmPFC (Behrens et al., 2008).
A role for the OFC in peer-related valuations has also been sug-
gested based on a recent single-unit study in monkey by Watson
and Platt (2012), in which subjects chose between receiving fluid
rewards or viewing socially relevant images. Neurons recorded in
the OFC consistently registered socially relevant information and
signaled attentional duration toward social imagery (Watson and
Platt, 2012), suggesting an important role for OFC in assessing
conspecifics. While neither of the above tasks were competitive
in nature, it is likely that the same prefrontal regions would be
active in competitive tasks, when peer group characteristics (g,
y) need to be assessed and integrated with resource information
(x) to guide choice behavior. The higher the utility estimate that
results fromU = x+ (x ∗ (a1 ∗ (g ∗ y))), the higher the likelihood
that a subject will choose to engage in competition.
Multi-factorial utility assessments continue in the outcome
evaluation phase. Successful achievement of a goal following
aggressive action should result in two further endowment effects
on perceived utility: one stemming from effort expenditure (e),
and one from continued peer interest (a2). Effort itself is generally
aversive and can discount initial estimates of x, affecting choice
behavior (Walton et al., 2007; Botvinick et al., 2009; Hillman and
Bilkey, 2010, 2012). However, expended effort can also enhance
perceived value of an outcome once achieved, in line with theories
of cognitive dissonance and deservingness (Feather et al., 2011;
Johnson and Gallagher, 2011). Rewards acquired after skill or
effort assume higher subjective worth than if acquired via wind-
fall or with little effort (Zink et al., 2004; Vostroknutov et al., 2012;
Hernandez Lallement et al., 2013). For example, participants who
exert high-effort to obtain monetary rewards are subsequently
more averse to donating that money, vs. donating money gained
by windfall (Hernandez Lallement et al., 2013).
The amount of tactical effort required (e) should therefore
enhance perceived utility immediately after the contested-for out-
come has been achieved: U = x+ (x ∗ (a1 ∗ (g ∗ y)))+ e. When
effort is required to obtain a reward, BOLD activity increases
in the amygdala and striatum upon reward receipt, while OFC
reward-related activity remains unchanged (Elliott et al., 2004;
Zink et al., 2004; Katsyri et al., 2013). Importantly, as recently
shown by Hernandez Lallement et al. (2013), the endowment
effect of effort is dependent on the size of reward obtained.
High-effort that results in high reward appears to have a positive
endowment effect, and correlates to increased activity in the ven-
tral striatum. However, high-effort that results in a low reward is
a disagreeable situation, and correlates to increased activity in AI
(Hernandez Lallement et al., 2013).
If a goal is successfully achieved following direct competitive
aggression, perceived utility should also be enhanced by contin-
ued peer interest or desire for the contested-for outcome (a2,
where 0< a2 < 1), a subtle schadenfreude type endowment effect.
Continued peer interest endowment (a2) may be modified by
peer group composition (1 < g < 2), similar to what is pro-
posed for a1, whereby U = x+ (x ∗ (a1 ∗ (g ∗ y)))+ e+ (a2 ∗ g).
Schadenfreude and its opposing partner envy are more likely
to arise when fellow competitors (g) are self-relevant, salient
conspecifics (Takahashi et al., 2009). BOLD activity in the ven-
tral striatum and OFC correlate to self-reports of schadenfreude
(McClure et al., 2004; Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Takahashi et al.,
2009), and activity in the dorsal ACC to self-reports of envy
(Takahashi et al., 2009). Ventral striatal activations are also noted
in two-person tasks that are not explicitly competitive, but where
monetary pay-out information is provided to both players at the
end of each trial (Fliessbach et al., 2007). If person A’s payout is
higher than that of person B, striatal activity increases in person
A and decreases in person B, independent of the actual financial
amount being awarded (Fliessbach et al., 2007).
When resource valuation, pre- and post-competition, is
viewed in this multi-factorial light, it helps to explain the
“joy” of winning, or conversely the enhanced feelings of loss,
unfairness or pain after losing. Whereas in non-competitive
situations one might gain/lose a resource of U = x, in a
competitive situation one gains/loses a resource of U =
x+ (x ∗ (a1 ∗ (g ∗ y)))+ e+ (a2 ∗ g). The joy of winning and pain
of losing have recently been posited as single variables ρwin
and ρloss by van den Bos et al. (2013) and incorporated into a
verifiable learning model. Herein a starting framework is pro-
posed to account for the skewed utility estimates of contested-for
resources, which would help to explain differences in motivated
action based on the presence of a competitor and the animacy
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of that competitor. When humans or monkeys compete against
conspecifics, compared to against a computer, they are more
attentive and quicker to act (Washburn et al., 1990; Hosokawa
and Watanabe, 2012; van den Bos et al., 2013). However, sub-
optimal action can often result; e.g., bidding approaches rational
agent predictions when humans compete against computers, but
characteristics of the Winner’s Curse appear when humans play
against other humans (van den Bos et al., 2008, 2013). Competing
against a conspecific elicits greater neural activity in outcome
valuation networks and the IAN as compared to competing
against a computer (Zink et al., 2008), perhaps indicative of this
multi-factorial utility assessment.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In non-pathological conditions, competitive aggression is an
instrumental behavior, used to achieve an outcome that aids in
self-preservation. Inherently it is a selfish behavior, with a binary
outcome for the individual: good or bad. Reduced in this way, it
is intuitive that competitive aggression utilizes reward-based rein-
forcement learning systems in the brain. As competitive behavior
neuroscience progresses, it will be important to test social and
non-social choice tasks in the same participant, in the same ses-
sion, to delineate any uniquely social computations. Moreover,
highly salient, realistic resources should be included in the non-
social choice tasks to ensure directional attention that is on
par with the directional attention prompted by the prospect of
winning. It will be important to parse temporal sequences of acti-
vation in terms of pre-choice, choice, and post-choice, and to
examine functional coupling between reward networks and the
IAN that may be predictive of competitive dispositions.
In part competitive aggression is a learned mode of behav-
ior, repeated when it is reinforced. But it is also a behavior
motivated by skewed utility estimates, which may account for
some of the violations of associative learning that are com-
monly observed in competitive environments. A preliminary
model has been posed herein to illustrate how, in competi-
tive scenarios, peer group endowment effects act to artificially
inflate perceived benefit of a resource in the decision phase [U =
x+ (x ∗ (a1 ∗ (g ∗ y)))] and in the outcome evaluation phase
[U = x+ (x ∗ (a1 ∗ (g ∗ y)))+ e+ (a2 ∗ g)]. These skewed util-
ity estimates can prompt competitive actions which are ulti-
mately costly to the individual or group. Peer group endowment
effects may be particularly strong in adolescence (Blakemore and
Robbins, 2012), in corporate cultures (Malhotra et al., 2008), or
more generally in contemporay society, where winning is often
prioritized above all else. Thus, the first rule of aggressive compet-
itive action should be cost-benefit analysis, but mindfully careful
cost-benefit assessment at that.
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